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4 May 1962

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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## DAILY BRIEF

\*USSR-Berlin: A 3 May authoritative Pravda article, which bluntly restated Moscow's position on Berlin and Germany and cast doubt on the West's desire for a peaceful settlement, was timed to coincide with Allied consultations at the NATO ministerial meeting in Athens.


Pravda's warning that "provocative visits" to West Berlin by West German leaders might "complicate" the US-Soviet talks and "frustrate" an agreement was occasioned by President Luebke's presence at May Day ceremonies in West Berlin and by Chancellor Adenauer's forthcoming visit to the city on 8 May to address a West German labor congress. The article reflected the Soviet leaders' sensitivity to recent statements by Secretary Rusk which contradicted the relatively optimistic assessments of the Berlin talks made recently by Khrushchev and Gromyko.

Pravda hinted that further negotiations would be futile if the US adheres to its position that termination of the Western "occupation regime" in West Berlin and the withdrawal of "occupation troops" are not negotiable. Although Pravda sought to convey the impression that Moscow's patience may soon be exhausted, the article avoided any threat of a break-off and reaffirmed Soviet interest in "honest and serious talks."

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Congo: [Tshombé has delayed his departure for Leopoldville because of differences which have arisen in talks between him and UN Chief Gardiner preliminary to the resumption of Tshombé's negotiations with Adoula, according to the US Consulate. Tshombé had been scheduled to go to Leopoldville on 3 May. Gardiner flew to Elisabethville on 30 April to attempt to obtain Tshombé's agreement to proposals for Katangan reintegration before his meeting with Adoula.]


[Some agreement between Gardiner and Tshombé has reportedly been reached on the future relationship of the Katangan gendarmerie to the central government. The question of tax collection, disbursement, and sharing of revenues between Leopoldville]


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[redacted] and Katanga, however, is reported to be a "big stumbling block." [redacted]

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\*Communist China - Pakistan: Communist China and Pakistan announced on 3 May that they had agreed to negotiate a formal delimitation of their frontier. This announcement, which culminates more than a year of exchanges between the two capitals, makes clear that the negotiations contemplate a provisional accord limited to the Hunza area of Kashmir where Pakistani and Chinese personnel are in direct contact. A formal treaty will not be negotiated until the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir is settled.

It is likely that the primary objective of both governments in making the formal announcement at this time is to embarrass and apply pressure on India. The timing is particularly advantageous to the Chinese who evidently hope, in view of the continuing impasse on the Sino-Indian border problem, to make India appear isolated from its Asian neighbors in refusing Chinese offers to negotiate. To this end, Peiping has been giving extensive publicity to its successful boundary negotiations with Burma and Nepal.

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Burma: [redacted]

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[ ]

[ ] Ne Win, in his 30 April statement on socialist goals for Burma, seems to have adopted the more extreme approach advocated by Tin Pe. A factor in Ne Win's decision was probably his fear of Aung Gyi as a potential rival and his determination to reduce Aung Gyi's influence and power. Some Burmese observers fear that the divergent views within the council will result ultimately in an open split. [ ]

[ ] (Backup, Page 1)

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Japan-Okinawa: [ ] A senior official of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, with the support of the prime minister's office, has objected to the US intention to limit forthcoming negotiations with Japan concerning the Ryukyu Islands to economic assistance. Asian Bureau Counselor Uyama told US Embassy officers on 1 May that the Japanese Government would present talking papers covering passport issuance, extradition procedures, and flying of the Japanese flag on Okinawan vessels. Uyama also pressed for the early sending of Japanese technical experts to Okinawa. He asserted that frequent visits of Japanese teams were necessary to work out a satisfactory economic development program.]

[ ] A major factor in Tokyo's pressure regarding the Okinawan question is Prime Minister Ikeda's desire to demonstrate to the Japanese public, before the elections of the upper house in July, that his government is actively safeguarding Japan's "residual sovereignty" in the Ryukyu Islands. The government itself, however, has resorted several times to actions and statements.]

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[ ] which have had the effect of maintaining, if not increasing, public concern over the Okinawan problem [ ]

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[ ] Austria: [ ] Chancellor Gorbach has been attempting to reschedule his 25-27 June official visit to Paris, following receipt of an invitation from Soviet Ambassador Avilov on 1 May to visit Moscow on the same dates. Foreign Minister Kreisky, much annoyed at Gorbach's yielding to Soviet wishes, has refused to intervene with the French because of De Gaulle's probable strong reaction to such a change of schedule. The US Embassy in Vienna comments that this development will increase the political strains within the Gorbach-Kreisky delegation now visiting Washington [ ]

[ ] TASS announced on 2 May that Gorbach has accepted "with gratitude" an invitation to visit Moscow during the latter half of June. The Soviet Union may use the Moscow talks to reiterate past warnings that association with the European Common Market would be incompatible with Austrian neutrality [ ]

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Problems for the Union Revolutionary Council in Burma

The Union Revolutionary Council (URC) is less likely to provide stability in Burma than Ne Win's caretaker regime in 1958-60. Although there has been no overt civilian opposition to the military government, the bases for discontent are more widespread and antipathies for the government more deeply held than they were in the past. Moreover, the present military government, because of the loss of senior army officials in the February 1961 military shake-up, is far weaker in administrative ability and experience than was the earlier regime. The present popular acceptance of military rule is apparently based on the lack of an acceptable alternative or rallying point. [redacted] U Nu's maladministration in the past two years greatly diminished his national prestige and popularity.

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Ne Win's public statement of policy is in essence a restatement of long-standing Burmese goals even though it represents the extremist and minority position within the URC. [redacted]

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[redacted] Aung Gyi, who urged moderation, represented nine of the seventeen council members, while Tin Pe spoke for seven. Ne Win, throwing his lot with Tin Pe, ordered the acceptance of the minority position. If the policies in Ne Win's "Burmese Way to Socialism" are put into effect, Burma will be forced into a position in which Western ideas have little influence. Aung Gyi apparently accepted defeat at this time because he lacks adequate support throughout the army. He is reputedly the only council member with the courage to challenge Ne Win's decisions.

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[redacted] whereas in his previous regime Ne Win was careful to cultivate the ethnic minorities by maintaining their elected representatives with his cabinet, in this instance he has made no concessions to minority aspirations and has cited separatism as the immediate cause for his military coup. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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